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39 
Note 
DAVIS V. FEC: CLOSING THE ROAD TO WASHINGTON FOR 
JOE THE PLUMBER 
SAMEER VADERA  
In Davis v. FEC,1 the Supreme Court of the United States considered 
whether the financing regulatory scheme contained in Section 319(a) of the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (―BCRA‖)2 violated a self-
financing candidate‘s First Amendment rights.3  The Court held that the 
asymmetrical contribution limits that Section 319(a) imposed on candidates 
campaigning for the same seat in the United States House of 
Representatives impermissibly burdened the self-financing candidate‘s 
freedom of speech.4  In so holding, the Court incorrectly applied strict 
scrutiny to Section 319(a)‘s contribution limits, instead of the ―closely 
drawn‖ standard that prior case law established.5  By failing to apply the 
―closely drawn‖ standard to the Act‘s contribution limits, the Court 
increased barriers for non-wealthy candidates running for political seats by 
(1) failing to protect fair and competitive elections and (2) jeopardizing 
public funding as a viable method for clean elections.6  Had the Court 
applied the ―closely drawn‖ scrutiny standard to Section 319(a), it would 
have validated effective campaign finance reform that treats the concerns of 
corruption in politics.7 
 
Copyright © 2009 by Sameer Vadera. 
 Sameer Vadera is a second-year student at the University of Maryland School of Law 
where he is a staff member for the Maryland Law Review.  The author wishes to thank Professor 
Gordon G. Young for providing great insight into the constitutional issues of campaign finance 
regulations.  The author owes special thanks to Kerry T. Cooperman and Heather R. Pruger for 
their limitless goodwill, excellent editing, and invaluable intellectual support.  Finally, the author 
is forever grateful to his family and friends for their continued encouragement.   
 1. 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008). 
 2. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.). 
 3. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2770. 
 4. Id. at 2771.   
 5. See infra Part IV.A. 
 6. See infra Part IV.B. 
 7. See infra Part IV.C. 
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I.  THE CASE 
Section 319 of the BCRA, known as the ―Millionaires‘ Amendment,‖8 
regulates the expenditures of candidates running for election to the United 
States House of Representatives (―House‖).9  Section 319(a) imposes 
asymmetrical contribution limits on candidates when (1) one candidate 
spends more than $350,000 of personal funds and (2) the opposing 
candidate does not finance his own campaign.10  When Section 319(a) takes 
effect, the self-financing candidate must adhere to typical campaign 
contribution limits,11 but the non-self-financing candidate may receive three 
times the typical contributions.12  Section 319(b) compels the self- 
financing candidate to disclose more information than the non-self- 
financing candidate.13  
In March 2006, Democrat Jack Davis ran for New York‘s 26th 
Congressional District seat in the House.14  To commence his candidacy, 
Davis filed a ―Statement of Candidacy‖ with the Federal Election 
Commission (―FEC‖).15  Unlike his opponent, Davis self-financed his 
campaign and disclosed that he anticipated spending $1 million in personal 
funds, which triggered Section 319(a)‘s asymmetrical regulatory scheme.16  
Two months later, Davis sued the FEC, asking the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia to enjoin the FEC from enforcing 
 
 8. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2766.   
 9. BCRA § 319, 2 U.S.C. § 441a-1 (2006).  The BCRA also includes a provision regulating 
elections for the United States Senate that is similar, but not identical, to § 319(a).  See 2 U.S.C. 
§ 441a(i) (2006). 
 10. 2 U.S.C. § 441a-1(a); see also Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2766.  A non-self-financing candidate 
may begin receiving increased contribution amounts when his opponent‘s Opposition Personal 
Funds Amount (―OPFA‖) surpasses $350,000.  2 U.S.C. § 441a-1(a)(1).  To calculate the self-
financing candidate‘s OPFA, the non-self-financing candidate must add his opponent‘s 
expenditures of personal funds to ―50% of the funds raised for the election at issue.‖  Id. § 441a-
1(a)(2)(A)-(B).   
 11. 2 U.S.C. § 441a-1(a)(1).  The contribution limit for individual donors is currently set at 
$2,300.  Id. § 441a(a)(1)(A); 72 Fed. Reg. 5295 (Feb. 5, 2007).  However, Congress adjusts the 
contribution limits for inflation every two years.  2 U.S.C. § 441a(c).  In addition, a candidate may 
not accept funds from a donor who has contributed a total of $42,700 to other candidates and their 
committees.  2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3)(A); 72 Fed. Reg. 5295 (Feb. 5, 2007). 
 12. 2 U.S.C. § 441a-1(a)(1)(A).  During the period of increased contribution limits, the non-
self-financing candidate may receive up to $6,900 from each individual donor.  See id.   
 13. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2766–67.  Specifically, the self-financing candidate must (1) reveal 
the amount of personal funds he or she intends to spend beyond the $350,000 threshold, (2) notify 
the FEC when the OPFA has surpassed $350,000, and (3) notify the FEC regarding each 
additional $10,000 expenditure of personal funds.  Id.  The non-self-financing candidate need only 
notify the FEC of receipt of the self-financing candidate‘s notice indicating an OPFA greater than 
$350,000.  Id. at 2767.  
 14. Id. at 2767. 
 15. Id.  
 16. Id.  
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Section 319 during the 2006 campaign on the grounds that Section 319 
violated the First and Fifth Amendments.17  Both parties filed cross-
motions for summary judgment.18   
Granting summary judgment in favor of the FEC, the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia concluded that, although Davis 
had standing to sue, his claims lacked merit.19  The court held that, because 
Section 319(a) did not impose any burden on the self-financing candidate‘s 
freedom to speak, it did not violate the First Amendment.20  In addition, the 
court held that, because Section 319(a) merely equalized the candidates‘ 
financial strength, it did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.21  Davis 
appealed directly to the Supreme Court of the United States under the 
BCRA‘s exclusive appellate review provision.22 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Because ―virtually every‖ form of political speech requires the 
expenditure of money, the Supreme Court has consistently held that any 
regulation on campaign financing implicates freedom of speech concerns.23  
The Court mainly applies the First Amendment to two aspects of campaign 
finance regulations: (1) contributions and (2) expenditures.24  First, the 
Court invalidates campaign contribution limits unless they are ―closely 
drawn‖ to serve a sufficiently important governmental interest.25  Second, 
the Court strikes down limits on campaign expenditures unless they are 
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.26  Recently, 
however, a number of state and federal courts have broken away from 
traditional campaign finance notions and have held that expenditure limits 
are not per se unconstitutional.27   
 
 17. Id.  Davis argued that § 319(a) burdened his First Amendment right to fund his own 
speech because it let his opponent raise more money to finance contradictory speech.  Id. at 2770. 
 18. Id. at 2768. 
 19. See Davis v. FEC, 501 F. Supp. 2d 22, 27, 32, 34 (D.D.C. 2007) (acknowledging that 
Davis suffered the requisite injury to satisfy standing requirements, but holding that § 319(a) did 
not violate the First or Fifth Amendments). 
 20. Id. at 31. 
 21. Id. at 33–34. 
 22. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2768.  The BCRA mandates that a final decision shall be reviewable 
only by appeal directly to the Supreme Court of the United States.  Bipartisan Campaign Reform 
Act of 2002, § 403(a)(3), 2 U.S.C. § 437h note (2006).  The Court must ―advance on the docket 
and . . . expedite to the greatest possible extent the disposition of the . . . appeal.‖  Id. § 403(a)(4), 
2 U.S.C. § 437h note. 
 23. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (per curiam); see also infra Part II.A. 
 24. See infra Part II.B.   
 25. See infra Part II.B.1.   
 26. See infra Part II.B.2.   
 27. See infra Part II.C.   
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A.   The Supreme Court Views Campaign Spending as Protected 
Speech Under the First Amendment Because “Virtually Every” 
Means of Political Speech Requires the Expenditure of Money 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that 
―Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.‖28  Its 
purpose is to preserve an ―uninhibited marketplace of ideas‖ where the truth 
ultimately prevails.29  In addition, the Constitution grants Congress the 
power to ―make or alter‖ rules governing federal elections.30  In applying 
the First Amendment to campaign finance legislation, the Supreme Court 
has consistently held that, because money enables political speech, 
restrictions on campaign funding restrain free speech.31   
The Supreme Court first determined that campaign finance limits 
regulated speech, not conduct, in Buckley v. Valeo,32 where several 
politicians claimed that certain provisions of the amended Federal Elections 
Campaign Act (―FECA‖)33 violated their First Amendment rights.34  In 
applying the First Amendment to the FECA, the Court observed that limits 
on funding seriously impaired the quality, depth, and range of political 
expression.35  Thus, the Court rejected the notion that restrictions on 
spending targeted conduct, not speech.36  The Court further explained that 
the dependence of communication on expenditures of money does not 
reduce the level of scrutiny that the First Amendment requires.37  Since 
Buckley, the Court has strictly adhered to this belief.38   
 
 28. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 29. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).  
 30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. 
 31. See infra notes 32–38 and accompanying text.  
 32. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
 33. Federal Elections Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 
(codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–442).  
 34. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 6–9. 
 35. Id. at 19. 
 36. Id. at 16 (―We cannot share the view that the [FECA‘s] contribution and expenditure 
limitations are comparable to the restrictions on conduct upheld in O’Brien.‖). 
 37. Id.  
 38. See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 242 (2006) (noting that during the previous 
thirty years, the Supreme Court has repeatedly adhered to Buckley‘s constraints on expenditure 
limits); Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657 (1990) (applying the Buckley 
framework to determine the constitutionality of Michigan‘s campaign finance laws). 
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B.   Statutes Imposing Direct Contribution and Expenditure Limits for 
Campaign Spending Implicate First Amendment Concerns Because 
Both Reduce Political Expression 
In attempting to reform campaign finance regulatory schemes, 
Congress has consistently targeted ―big money‖ because of the belief that 
large contributions and expenditures corrupt the electoral process.39  To 
address this problem, Congress has established a limits-based approach.40  
The Court scrutinizes Congress‘s limits in two ways.  First, the Court 
invalidates contribution limits unless they are closely drawn to serve a 
substantially important governmental interest.41  Second, the Court strikes 
down expenditure limits unless Congress has narrowly tailored them to 
serve a compelling governmental interest.42   
1. Because Contribution Limits Reduce Corruption and the 
Appearance of Corruption, the Supreme Court Sustains These 
Limits Unless They Are so Low as to Prevent Effective 
Campaigning 
The first enactment aimed at reducing the harmful influence of ―big 
money‖ campaign contributions followed President Theodore Roosevelt‘s 
call for legislation forbidding all contributions by corporations.43  In 
response, Congress enacted the Tillman Act of 1907,44 which completely 
banned corporate contributions in connection with any federal election.45  
As corporations used loopholes to bypass regulations, Congress responded 
by enacting the Federal Corrupt Practices Act,46 which broadened 
―contributions‖ to include ―anything of value.‖47  The Act withstood an 
attack in Burroughs v. United States,48 where directors of a political action 
committee violated the Act‘s disclosure requirements by accepting 
contributions without filing reports.49  The defendants challenged 
 
 39. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 115 (2003) (stating that Congress ―has repeatedly 
enacted legislation‖ that prevents ―great aggregations of wealth‖). 
 40. See id. at 115–22 (discussing the history of the limits-based approach to address campaign 
finance issues). 
 41. See infra Part II.B.1.   
 42. See infra Part II.B.2.   
 43. United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 571–72 (1957). 
 44. Pub. L. No. 59-36, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864. 
 45. Id. 34 Stat. at 864–65. 
 46. Pub. L. No. 68-506, §§ 301, 313, 43 Stat. 1070, 1074 (1925) (codified as amended at 2 
U.S.C. §§ 241–248). 
 47. Id. § 302(d).  The Act criminalized both the giving and receiving of corporate 
contributions.  Id. § 313. 
 48. 290 U.S. 534 (1934). 
 49. Id. at 543. 
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Congress‘s authority to require disclosure of political contributions, arguing 
that the Constitution limited Congress‘s role to choosing the date and time 
of elections.50  In upholding the Act, the Court rejected the defendants‘ 
argument and concluded that Congress had the inherent power to protect the 
elections, ―‗on which its existence depends,‘‖51 from corruption.52   
Shortly after World War II, Congress extended its prohibition to 
campaign contributions made by unions.53  Following the expansive trend 
of campaign regulations, Congress also expanded its restrictions to cover 
both primary and general elections.54  Consistently, Congress justified its 
increasingly prohibitive campaign finance reform by emphasizing the 
growing concern of the parasitic effects of large campaign contributions on 
the electoral system.55 
In 1974, Congress further strengthened federal election laws by 
enacting the FECA.56  The Act limited (1) contributions that a candidate 
could receive, (2) expenditures of personal funds a candidate could make, 
and (3) expenditures an individual or organization could make in support of 
a candidate.57  In 1976, the Supreme Court in Buckley addressed whether 
the First Amendment invalidated the FECA‘s campaign finance 
restrictions.58  In a per curiam decision, the Supreme Court upheld the 
FECA‘s contribution restrictions.59  Distinguishing contributions from 
expenditures, the Court found that, although both ―implicate fundamental 
First Amendment interests,‖ direct limits on expenditures cause more 
severe restrictions on the protected freedom of political expression.60  In 
contrast, the Court observed that contribution limits allow individuals to 
 
 50. Id. at 544.  The defendants argued that Article II, Section 1 only granted Congress the 
authority to determine ―‗the time of choosing the electors, and the day on which they shall give 
their votes.‘‖  Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1). 
 51. Id. at 546 (quoting Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 658 (1884)). 
 52. See id. at 547 (―The power of Congress to protect the election of President and Vice 
President from corruption being clear, the choice of means to that end presents a question 
primarily addressed to the judgment of Congress.‖). 
 53. See War Labor Disputes Act of 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-89, ch. 144, § 9, 57 Stat. 167.  
Congress regulated unions because they made ―enormous financial outlays‖ in connection with 
national elections.  United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 579 (1957). 
 54. See Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, ch. 120, §§ 304, 313, 
61 Stat. 136, 159 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141–187). 
 55. See 93 CONG. REC. 3428, 3522 (1947); H.R. REP. NO. 245 (1947); S. REP. NO. 1 (1947). 
 56. See also McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 117–18 (2003) (documenting Congress‘s 
―steady‖ improvement of election law over the years).   
 57. FECA § 101.  See also Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 
93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–442). 
 58. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1976) (per curiam). 
 59. Id. at 35 (―[W]e conclude that the impact of the [FECA‘s] . . . contribution limitation on 
major-party challengers and on minor-party candidates does not render the provision 
unconstitutional on its face.‖). 
 60. Id. at 23. 
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associate with a political party, and that limiting the amount of the 
contribution places a permissible burden on the First Amendment rights of 
voters.61  Additionally, the Court determined that the government‘s interest 
in limiting corruption and the appearance of corruption resulting from large 
financial contributions was ―a constitutionally sufficient‖ justification for 
contribution limits, but not for expenditure limits.62   
In 2000, the Court in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC63 
reemphasized the constitutional validity of contribution limits by holding 
that Buckley was ―authority for comparable state regulations.‖64  In Nixon, a 
candidate for public office challenged a Missouri campaign finance law that 
limited contributions to $1,075.65  Upholding the contribution limits after 
applying ―closely drawn‖ scrutiny, the Court revisited Buckley‘s analysis 
and concluded that ―[t]here [was] no reason in logic . . . to doubt‖ 
Buckley.66  The Court highlighted Buckley‘s reasoning that, although 
contribution limits marginally impaired political communication, Congress 
had a valid interest in reducing corruption by limiting political donations.67  
Lastly, the Court explained that Buckley did not specify a constitutional 
minimum contribution limit, but that Congress may legislate these limits so 
long as they do not ―render political association ineffective.‖68   
In 2002, Congress enacted the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 
(―BCRA‖)69 to close the FECA‘s loopholes and to address the state of 
political campaigning since Buckley.70  The BCRA imposed asymmetrical 
contribution limits on candidates when a self-financing candidate surpassed 
$350,000 in expenditures.71  In 2003, a group of public officials and other 
various organizations challenged portions of the BCRA in McConnell v. 
FEC.72  The Court reaffirmed that it must pay special deference to 
Congress when scrutinizing contribution limits because such limits do not 
implicate severe First Amendment concerns.73  The Court explained further 
that the less rigorous ―closely drawn‖ standard is the appropriate standard to 
 
 61. Id. at 20–22. 
 62. Id. at 26. 
 63. 528 U.S. 377 (2000). 
 64. Id. at 382. 
 65. Id. at 382–83.  The plaintiff claimed that, with inflation since Buckley, the limit of $1,075 
was too low.  Id. at 383–84.  
 66. Id. at 386–88, 397. 
 67. Id. at 387–88. 
 68. Id. at 397. 
 69. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.) 
 70. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 132–33 (2003). 
 71. BCRA § 319, 2 U.S.C. § 441a-1(a) (2006). 
 72. 540 U.S. 93; see also McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 220–27 (2003). 
 73. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 137. 
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allow Congress to effectively improve campaign finance regulations.74  
Justice Kennedy dissented in part, commenting that the majority‘s decision 
―expand[ed] Congress‘ regulatory power,‖ even though Buckley did not 
grant Congress the power to ―shape[] and form[]‖ campaign finance 
regulations.75   
Most recently, in Randall v. Sorrell,76 the Court expressed the need for 
restrictions on Congress‘s ability to impose contribution limits in 
elections.77  In Randall, several politicians challenged Vermont‘s 
contribution limits as unconstitutionally low.78  The Randall plurality79 
explained that if limits are too low, they may ―harm the electoral process by 
preventing challengers from mounting effective campaigns against 
incumbent officeholders.‖80  Thus, the plurality acknowledged that, 
although the Court ―ordinarily . . . defer[s] to the legislature‘s 
determination,‖ it does not do so when limits are so low as to be 
counterproductive.81 
2.  Limits on Campaign Expenditures Involve More Serious First 
Amendment Concerns Than Limits on Campaign Contributions 
Because Expenditure Limits Infringe on a Candidate’s 
Constitutional Right to Promote His or Her Platform 
The FECA was the first campaign finance legislation to directly limit a 
candidate‘s expenditures.82  The Buckley Court observed that the FECA‘s 
expenditure limits substantially reduced the amount of political speech in 
campaigns.83  Specifically, the Court noted that, although the restrictions on 
 
 74. Id.  For example, before enactment of the BCRA, federal law permitted corporations and 
unions to make unlimited contributions directly to a political party, instead of to a specific 
candidate, thus circumventing FECA regulations and disclosure requirements.  Id. at 122–23.  
However, Title I of the BCRA attempted to improve campaign finance by ―plug[ging] the soft-
money loophole.‖  Id. at 133. 
 75. Id. at 286–87 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).   
 76. 548 U.S. 230 (2006). 
 77. Id. at 248–49 (―Nonetheless, as Buckley acknowledged, we must recognize the existence 
of some lower bound.‖). 
 78. Id. at 239–40.  Vermont‘s campaign contribution statute limited contributions from 
individuals to $200 per election per candidate.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2805(a) (2002).  
 79. Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Breyer, and Justice Alito were members of the Randall 
plurality.  Randall, 548 U.S. at 236. 
 80. Id. at 248–49.  
 81. Id. 
 82. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 118–19 (2003). 
 83. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39 (1976) (per curiam) (―It is clear that a primary effect of 
these expenditure limitations is to restrict the quantity of campaign speech by individuals, groups, 
and candidates.‖). 
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expenditures are neutral as to content,84 they ―limit political expression ‗at 
the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms.‘‖85  
The Court reasoned that the government‘s interests in limiting personal 
expenditures did not justify infringing on candidates‘ ―unfettered‖ right to 
voice their platforms to the electorate.86  First, the Court determined that the 
primary governmental interest in preventing corruption and the appearance 
of corruption did not support limitations on a candidate‘s expenditures of 
personal funds.87  Specifically, a candidate using personal funds can rely 
less on outside contributions, thereby counteracting ―coercive pressures‖ 
and eliminating the need for expenditure limits.88  Second, the 
government‘s interest in equalizing candidates‘ financial resources did not 
sufficiently justify the FECA‘s severe infringement on candidates‘ 
protected right to advance their own political platforms.89  
Justice White wrote a separate opinion in which he dissented from the 
judgment invalidating the expenditure limits and concurred in the judgment 
upholding contribution limits.90  Justice White explained that, because the 
FECA‘s expenditure limits were content-neutral, the Court should have 
upheld the FECA‘s expenditure limits ―so long as the purposes they 
serve[d] [were] legitimate and sufficiently substantial.‖91  Justice White 
noted that the Court should defer to congressional judgment because 
Congress legitimately sought to reduce corruption by imposing expenditure 
limits.92 
 
 84. Prior case law indicates that content-based restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny 
because the First Amendment bars the government from restricting speech based on its message, 
idea, or subject matter.  See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774, 788 
(2002) (invalidating a judicial election statute because it prohibited speech based on its content); 
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 123 (1991) 
(invalidating a statute because it significantly burdened speech of a particular content); Police 
Dept. of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 94 (1972) (invalidating a disorderly conduct ordinance 
because it permitted picketing based on its subject matter).  But see Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 
191, 211 (1992) (upholding content-based regulations because the exercise of free speech within 
100 feet of a polling station conflicts with the fundamental right of voting free from intimidation 
and fraud).  In contrast, the Court applies the less rigorous intermediate scrutiny to content-neutral 
regulations.  See, e.g., United States v. O‘Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (holding that content-
neutral regulations are constitutional when they are ―no greater than is essential‖ to furthering an 
important or substantial governmental interest). 
 85. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968)). 
 86. Id. at 52–53.  
 87. Id. at 53. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 54. 
 90. Id. at 257 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).   
 91. See id. at 259–60, 263–64. 
 92. Id. at 261 (―Congress was . . . of the view that these expenditures . . . have corruptive 
potential; but the Court strikes down the provision . . . claiming more insight as to what may 
improperly influence candidates than is possessed by the majority of Congress that passed this bill 
and the President who signed it.‖). 
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In 1986, in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.,93 the FEC 
sued a nonprofit corporation for making political expenditures from its 
general treasury fund.94  The Court held that, although for-profit 
corporations must make independent campaign expenditures from 
segregated funds, nonprofit political associations may make campaign 
expenditures directly from their treasury funds.95  Justice Brennan, writing 
for the majority, reasoned that individuals who contribute to political 
associations are aware of their political purposes, and thus the political 
associations should not have to spend from segregated political funds.96 
Four years later, in Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce,97 
a corporation challenged a Michigan law that allowed corporations to make 
independent expenditures for a campaign from their segregated funds, but 
not from their general treasury funds.98  Applying strict scrutiny, the Court 
upheld the statute, finding that the Michigan legislature designed the 
restriction to assure that funds accumulated and used for campaign 
expenditures correlated to public support of the corporation‘s political 
ideas.99 
In 1996, in Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. 
FEC (―Colorado I‖),100 the Colorado Republican Party challenged a FECA 
provision limiting political party expenditures.101  Protecting political party 
spending, the Court struck down the provision and held that the First 
Amendment prohibits limits on party expenditures made independently, 
―without coordinating with a candidate.‖102  The Court reasoned that a 
political party, like a candidate, has a protected First Amendment right to 
independently express its political views.103 
The Court, however, resolved an issue left open by Colorado I in FEC 
v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee (―Colorado II‖),104 
 
 93. 479 U.S. 238 (1986). 
 94. Id. at 241. 
 95. Id. at 241, 263–64. 
 96. Id. at 260–61.  The Court noted that the treasury funds of nonprofit political associations 
―reflect popular support for the [organization‘s] political positions.‖  Id. at 258.  
 97. 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
 98. Id. at 654–55.  The segregated funds were required to be designated for political purposes 
only.  Id.  Under Michigan law, only certain individuals could donate funds to a corporation‘s 
segregated political fund.  Id. at 656 (citing Michigan Campaign Finance Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§§ 169.255(2), (3) (1979)). 
 99. Id. at 660.  
 100. 518 U.S. 604 (1996). 
 101. Id. at 608.  The FECA provision imposed dollar limits on political party ―expenditures in 
connection with a general election campaign for [a] congressional [candidate].‖  Id. (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
 102. Id.  
 103. Id. at 615–16. 
 104. 533 U.S. 431 (2001). 
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finding that coordinated party expenditures are similar to contributions, and 
thus the ―closely drawn‖ standard should apply to those spending limits.105  
The Colorado II Court held that unlimited coordinated party expenditures 
would increase corruption by enabling parties to circumvent the 
contribution limits that the FECA imposed and therefore upheld the 
expenditure limits.106 
In 2006, the Supreme Court rejected the opportunity to overturn 
Buckley when reexamining whether a limit on candidates‘ expenditures 
violated the First Amendment.107  In Randall v. Sorrell, the Vermont 
Republican State Committee challenged Vermont‘s mandatory spending 
limits as a violation of free speech.108  The Court held that the Vermont 
election law violated the Buckley standard, and thus the First 
Amendment.109  The Court declined this opportunity to overturn Buckley by 
determining that, because contribution limits adequately reduced 
corruption, there was no need to limit expenditures.110  Recognizing that 
Vermont‘s justification for its expenditure limits mimicked those set forth 
in Buckley, the Court also refused to limit Buckley‘s holding with respect to 
spending restrictions.111   
C.  Recently, a Number of State and Federal Courts Have Broken Away 
from Buckley’s Traditional View that No Governmental Interest 
Justifies Limits on a Candidate’s Expenditures of Personal Funds 
Because many courts have criticized Buckley,112 a number of lower 
federal and state courts have held that Buckley‘s holding does not foreclose 
limitations on a candidate‘s expenditures.113  For instance, in Kruse v. City 
of Cincinnati,114 a candidate for City Council challenged the city‘s 
campaign finance regulations that imposed expenditure limitations on 
candidates.115  Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
 
 105. Id. at 456. 
 106. Id. at 455, 465. 
 107. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 243 (2006).   
 108. Id. at 240.  Vermont‘s law imposed mandatory expenditure limits on the total amount a 
candidate for state office could spend during an election cycle. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2805a(a) 
(2002).  The law imposed expenditure limits in the following amounts: governor, $300,000; 
lieutenant governor, $100,000; state senator, $4,000; state representative (two member district), 
$3,000; and state representative (single member district), $2,000.  Id. 
 109. Randall, 548 U.S. at 246. 
 110. Id. at 244. 
 111. Id. at 244–46. 
 112. As of May 18, 2009, 100 court opinions viewed Buckley negatively on Westlaw‘s Citing 
References. 
 113. See infra notes 114–123. 
 114. 142 F.3d 907 (6th Cir. 1998). 
 115. Id. at 910. 
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Circuit invalidated the spending limits, the court observed that Buckley left 
open the question of whether any governmental interest would justify 
expenditure limits.116  Judge Cohn concurred separately, writing that 
Buckley did not declare all expenditure limits to be unconstitutional.117  
Rather, he suggested, a factual record may be developed that establishes a 
valid need for spending limits.118   
A few years later, in Homans v. City of Albuquerque,119 the United 
States District Court for the District of New Mexico heard a challenge to 
Albuquerque‘s mandatory expenditure limits from a candidate for 
mayor.120  Judge Vazquez, relying on Judge Cohn‘s concurring opinion in 
Kruse, determined that Buckley‘s holding was not a per se prohibition on 
spending limits because the Buckley Court only considered a limited set of 
interests.121  Judge Vazquez held that the city had developed a 
comprehensive factual record indicating the need for a limit on campaign 
spending and that these limits effectively reduced corruption and 
significantly increased voter turnout.122  On appeal, the Tenth Circuit 
affirmed the district court‘s determination that Buckley‘s holding did not 
foreclose expenditure limits per se.123   
III.  THE COURT‘S REASONING 
In Davis v. FEC,124 the United States Supreme Court reversed the 
judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia by 
holding that Sections 319(a) and (b) of the BCRA violated the First 
Amendment.125  Writing for a five-to-four majority, Justice Alito began by 
describing Section 319‘s asymmetrical regulatory scheme.126  First, the 
Court noted that, when triggered, Section 319(a) allows a non-self-
 
 116. Id. at 918–19. 
 117. Id. at 920 (Cohn, J., concurring) (―The Supreme Court‘s decision in Buckley, however, is 
not a broad pronouncement declaring all campaign expenditure limits unconstitutional.‖). 
 118. Id. (―It may be possible to develop a factual record to establish that the interest in freeing 
officeholders from the pressures of fundraising so they can perform their duties, or the interest in 
preserving faith in our democracy, is compelling  . . . .‖). 
 119. 160 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (D.N.M. 2001), aff’d, 366 F.3d 900 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 120. Id. at 1267. 
 121. Id. at 1271–72 (citing Kruse v. City of Cincinnati, 142 F.3d 907 (6th Cir. 1998)).  The 
Buckley Court only considered three governmental interests: corruption, the appearance of 
corruption, and equalizing the playing field.  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 53–54 (1976) (per 
curiam). 
 122. Homans, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 1272. 
 123. Homans v. City of Albuquerque, 366 F.3d 900, 906 (10th Cir. 2004) (―The [Buckley] 
Court's chosen language leaves open the possibility that at least in some circumstances 
expenditure limits may withstand constitutional scrutiny.‖). 
 124. 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008).   
 125. Id. at 2775. 
 126. Id. at 2766–67. 
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financing candidate to receive contributions from individuals at three times 
the normal limit.127  Second, the Court explained that Section 319(b) 
requires the self-financing candidate to make additional disclosures during 
the period Section 319(a) is active.128 
After determining that the Court had jurisdiction to hear Davis‘s 
appeal,129 the Court examined the merits of Davis‘s claim that Section 
319(a) violated the First Amendment.130  First, the Davis Court noted that if 
Section 319(a) had increased the contribution limits for all candidates, 
Davis‘s claim would have failed because there is no constitutional basis for 
arguing that such limits were too high.131  Second, the Court emphasized 
that Buckley established that a cap on personal expenditures directly 
restrained a candidate‘s First Amendment right to discuss public issues and 
advocate for his own election.132  Thus, Justice Alito explained, although 
the BCRA did not cap personal funds, it penalized a candidate for 
personally funding his First Amendment right.133  Further, Justice Alito 
noted that the Court had ―never upheld [a campaign finance statute] that 
impose[d] different contribution limits for candidates . . . competing against 
each other.‖134  Justice Alito concluded that, because no compelling state or 
government interest justified the substantial burden imposed on the self-
financing candidate, Section 319(a) was unconstitutional.135   
Finally, the Davis Court explained that Section 319(b) also violated 
the First Amendment because the provision imposed unjustified compelled 
 
 127. Id. at 2766.  The normal limit is $2,300 and the enhanced limit under the BCRA is $6,900.  
Id. 
 128. Id. at 2766–67. 
 129. In discussing standing, Justice Alito noted that Davis‘s undisputed standing to challenge 
§ 319(b) did not necessarily establish his standing to challenge § 319(a).  Id. at 2768–69.  Davis 
could challenge § 319(b) because he faced the imminent threat of submitting additional 
notifications after he passed the $350,000 threshold.  Id. at 2768.  In addition, invalidating 
§ 319(b) would have been an appropriate remedy for Davis.  Id.  The FEC argued that Davis 
lacked standing to challenge § 319(a) because Davis‘s opponent did not use the asymmetrical 
limits.  Id. at 2769.  However, the Court concluded that, even though the harm was not actualized, 
Davis‘s threatened injury was real, immediate, and direct, thus establishing his standing to contest 
§ 319(a).  Id.  Justice Alito then explained that Davis‘s claims were not moot because the case 
―‗fit comfortably within the established exception to mootness for disputes capable of repetition, 
yet evading review.‘‖  Id. (quoting FEC v. Wisc. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2662 
(2007)).  The ―exception applies where (1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be 
fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration; and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the 
same complaining party will be subject to the same action again.‖  Id. (quoting Wisc. Right to Life, 
127 S. Ct. at 2662) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 130. Id. at 2770. 
 131. Id. at 2770–71. 
 132. Id. at 2771 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 52 (1976) (per curiam)). 
 133. Id.  
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 2772–74. 
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disclosure.136  Justice Alito applied heightened scrutiny to Section 319(b) 
because compelled disclosure seriously infringed on the privacy of 
association guaranteed by the First Amendment.137  Justice Alito concluded 
that, in light of the Court‘s holding that Section 319(a) was 
unconstitutional, Section 319(b)‘s disclosure requirements could not be 
justified because they implemented the contribution limits.138 
Justice Stevens dissented separately, agreeing that Davis‘s case was 
justiciable, but disagreeing that the BCRA‘s contribution limits imposed a 
substantial burden on the self-financing candidate‘s freedom of speech.139  
Justice Stevens first stressed that Congress enacted Section 319(a) to reduce 
the self-financing candidate‘s advantage by relaxing the contribution limits 
the non-self-financing candidate would normally face.140  Further, Justice 
Stevens explained that the BCRA‘s reasonable limits are justified because 
they free candidates from the burden of endless fundraising and have the 
effect of improving the overall quality of the speech.141  Next, Justice 
Stevens explained that Section 319(a) did not restrain speech, but rather it 
enabled a non-self-financing candidate to obtain enough money to make his 
voice heard.142  Last, in addressing Davis‘s equal protection argument, 
Justice Stevens explained that because ―‗Congress is fully entitled to 
consider . . . real-world differences‘‖ in campaign finance laws, the 
Constitution does not require identical treatment of all candidates.143  
Justice Ginsburg wrote a short dissenting opinion, agreeing that Davis 
had standing to sue but ultimately agreeing with the lower court‘s 
decision.144  Justice Ginsburg explained that she did not join the part of 
Justice Stevens‘s opinion that addressed Buckley‘s holding that expenditure 
limits restricted political communications.145  Justice Ginsburg noted that 
the FEC did not ask the Davis Court to overrule Buckley, and thus a 
reconsideration of Buckley was inappropriate.146  
 
 136. Id. at 2774–75. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 2775. 
 139. Id. at 2777, 2780 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 140. Id.  
 141. Id. at 2779. 
 142. Id. at 2780. 
 143. Id. at 2782 (alteration in original) (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 188 (2003)). 
 144. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 145. Id.  
 146. Id. at 2782–83. 
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IV.  ANALYSIS 
In Davis v. FEC,
147
 the United States Supreme Court invalidated 
Section 319(a) of the BCRA, holding that it impermissibly burdened free 
speech because its limits chilled the self-financing candidate‘s right to make 
unlimited expenditures by benefitting his or her opponent.148  In so holding, 
the Court improperly raised the scrutiny standard applied to campaign 
contribution limits from ―closely drawn‖ scrutiny to strict scrutiny.149  The 
Court‘s decision effectively blocks non-wealthy candidates from competing 
against wealthy candidates seeking congressional seats by (1) exacerbating 
unfair competition and (2) bringing public funding into constitutional 
uncertainty.150  Had the Court applied ―closely drawn‖ scrutiny to uphold 
the BCRA‘s contribution limits, non-wealthy candidates would have the 
opportunity for fair campaigns, public funding would be constitutionally 
secure, and voter confidence in politics would increase.151 
A.  The Supreme Court Improperly Increased Scrutiny of Campaign 
Contribution Limits by Applying Strict Scrutiny, Which the Court 
Has Exclusively Reserved for Direct Expenditure Limits 
The Davis Court incorrectly applied strict scrutiny to the BCRA‘s 
contribution limits, which had an unclear effect on Davis‘s political 
speech,152 instead of the historically applicable ―closely drawn‖ standard of 
scrutiny.153  Justice Alito suggested that, because Section 319(a)‘s 
contribution limits impose a substantial burden on a candidate‘s freedom of 
speech, the limits were only valid if Congress could justify them with a 
compelling governmental interest.154  But, because contribution limits 
―entail[] only a marginal restriction upon the contributor‘s ability to engage 
 
 147. 128 S. Ct. 2759. 
 148. Id. at 2774 (majority opinion). 
 149. See infra Part IV.A.  The Court has traditionally applied the latter standard only in cases 
involving direct expenditure limits.  See supra Part II.B.2 
 150. See infra Part IV.B. 
 151. See infra Part IV.C. 
 152. During oral arguments, Justice Souter expressed reservations as to the chilling effect of 
§ 319(a): ―[D]on‘t we expect a chill argument to at least have a ring of plausibility? . . . It didn‘t 
deter your client.  There is no indication that it would deter anybody else and I have to say I don‘t 
see why it would.‖  Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Davis, 128 S. Ct. 2759 (No. 07-320). 
 153. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2772.  Some commentators argue that campaign finance laws do not 
create First Amendment concerns, and therefore that these laws do not warrant application of strict 
scrutiny.  See, e.g., Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism and the First 
Amendment, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1803, 1821 (1999) (arguing that other areas of the law, including 
contracts, warranties, deeds, fraud, and securities, are seen as regulating speech without any First 
Amendment scrutiny). 
 154. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2772. 
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/academics/journals/mdlr/endnotes/68_Vadera.pdf 
54 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ENDNOTES [VOL. 68:39 
in free communication,‖155 the Court has historically applied a ―closely 
drawn‖ scrutiny test.156  Indeed, in Nixon, where candidates challenged 
Missouri‘s contribution limits, the Court reversed the Eighth Circuit, which 
strictly scrutinized the limits, and instead applied ―closely drawn‖ 
scrutiny.157  In doing so, the Nixon Court declared that ―‗restrictions on 
contributions require less compelling justification than restrictions‘‖ on 
expenditures.158  Thus, because Section 319(a) imposed limits on 
contributions, not expenditures, the Davis Court incorrectly applied strict 
scrutiny. 
Under the ―closely drawn‖ scrutiny standard, the Davis Court should 
have upheld Section 319(a).  First, because the BCRA enables a non-self-
financing candidate to freely initiate debate and to respond to his 
opponent‘s speech without restriction, the BCRA‘s contribution limits do 
not impair political communication.159  Instead, as Justice Stevens noted in 
dissent, Section 319(a) does not quiet speech, but rather assists the non-
wealthy candidate spread his message.160  The BCRA‘s limits are 
distinguishable from the expenditure limits in Buckley because they do not 
impose a direct restraint on a candidate‘s communication.161  In fact, the 
self-financing candidate‘s ability to make unlimited expenditures counters 
the argument that Section 319(a) imposes a substantial burden on his 
political expression.162   
 
 155. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1976). 
 156. See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 253 (2006) (applying ―closely drawn‖ scrutiny 
to contribution limits because they do not significantly impair political communication); 
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 136 (2003) (same); FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 161–62 
(2003) (same); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov‘t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387–88 (2000) (same). 
 157. Nixon, 528 U.S. at 384–85, 387–88.   
 158. Id. at 387 (quoting FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 259–60 (1986)).  
See also Deborah Goldberg & Brenda Wright, Defending Campaign Contribution Limits After 
Randall v. Sorrell, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 661, 671–72 (2008) (commenting on the Nixon 
Court‘s rejection of arguments in favor of applying strict scrutiny to contribution limits). 
 159. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2780 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that § 319(a) does not 
impose any burden on the self-financing candidate because he has the option to make unlimited 
expenditures from his personal funds); Davis v. FEC, 501 F. Supp. 2d 22, 29 (D.D.C. 2007) 
(same).  
 160. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2780 (―On the contrary, it does no more than assist the opponent of a 
self-funding candidate in his attempts to make his voice heard . . . .‖).  Justice Stevens also noted 
that the self-financing candidate may structure his campaign as he pleases—either funding it 
himself without limits, or relying on contributions alone.  Id. at 2780 n.6. 
 161. Compare Davis, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 29 (stating that the ―Millionaires‘ Amendment does 
not limit in any way the use of a candidate‘s personal wealth‖ for political elections), with 
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39 (holding that FECA‘s expenditure limits impose ―direct and substantial 
restraints on the quantity of political speech‖). 
 162. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2780 (―The self-financing candidate‘s ability to engage meaningfully 
in the political process is in no way undermined by [§ 319(a)].‖). 
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Second, because the Court consistently defers to Congress when 
scrutinizing contribution limits,163 the Davis majority should have accepted 
Congress‘s good-faith attempt to ―regulate, within the bounds of the 
Constitution,‖ campaign finance.164  As Justice Stevens pointed out, 
Congress ―carefully tailored‖ Section 319(a) to address the unequal 
financial strength of candidates by creating the Opposition Personal Funds 
Amount formula, which prevents non-self-financing candidates from 
reaping windfalls.165  Moreover, as the Court has conceded in earlier cases, 
legislators are better equipped to make judgments on campaign finance 
reform because they have expertise in ―matters related to the costs and 
nature of running for office.‖166  Thus, heightening the level of scrutiny 
applied to the BCRA‘s contribution limits was improper and created 
substantial roadblocks for non-wealthy candidates attempting to run for 
public office.167 
B.   Davis Creates Substantial Barriers for Non-Wealthy Candidates 
Who Compete Against Wealthy Candidates for Seats in the House 
Because Competition Is Unfair and the Availability of Public 
Funding Is Declining 
The Davis Court‘s improper application of strict scrutiny to 
contribution limits disincentivizes non-wealthy candidates from running for 
public office for two reasons: (1) unfair campaign competition
168
 and (2) 
lack of public funding.
169
 
Davis‘s invalidation of the BCRA‘s contribution limits reduces fair 
competition in House races in two ways.  First, in striking down the 
BCRA‘s asymmetrical contribution limits for impermissibly chilling the 
self-financing candidate‘s speech, the Davis Court failed to address the 
advantage that wealthy candidates naturally have in House elections.170  
 
 163. See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 248 (2006) (stating that the Court ordinarily 
defers to the legislature in assessing the validity of campaign finance regulations because 
Congress is better equipped in matters related to running for office). 
 164. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2779. 
 165. Id. at 2780, 2782 (―[T]he self-funder‘s opponent may avail himself of the enhanced 
contribution limits only until parity is achieved, at which point he becomes again ineligible for 
contributions above the normal maximum.‖); see also supra note 10.  The two rationales of the 
Millionaires‘ Amendment are ―reducing the importance of wealth as a criterion for public office 
and countering the perception that seats in the United States Congress are available for purchase 
by the wealthiest bidder.‖  Id. at 2779–80. 
 166. Randall, 548 U.S. at 248. 
 167. See infra Part IV.B. 
 168. See infra notes 170–176 and accompanying text. 
 169. See infra notes 176–191 and accompanying text. 
 170. During the 2004 congressional elections, in 95% of House races and 91% of Senate races, 
the candidate who spent the most money won the seat.  2004 Election Outcome: Money Wins, 
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Absent the BCRA‘s protections, a non-wealthy candidate begins the 
campaign at a disadvantage because he lacks the benefit of immediately 
available funding, which a self-financing candidate enjoys.171  Thus, the 
Davis Court‘s determination that each election is a zero-sum game172 is 
only accurate when both candidates have equal funding.173  Otherwise, a 
non-wealthy candidate must spend more time fundraising, which prevents 
him from debating issues and promoting his platform.174  In contrast, 
because a wealthy candidate personally funds his campaign, he may 
communicate with the electorate without the additional time burden of 
fundraising.175  Furthermore, the BCRA‘s asymmetrical contribution limits 
cease once a non-wealthy candidate‘s funds match a wealthy candidate‘s 
funds.176  Thus, invalidating the BCRA‘s contribution limits reduces the 
fairness and competitiveness of campaigns by returning wealthy candidates‘ 
natural advantage.  
Second, the Davis Court neglected to recognize that political equality 
is a ―time-honored‖ principle and was a major concern for the Framers of 
the Constitution.177  Davis‘s invalidation of Section 319(a)‘s asymmetrical 
contribution limits jeopardizes viable public financing schemes by 
delegitimizing the need to level the playing field in the electoral process.  
Under the current campaign finance regime, non-wealthy members of the 
public campaigning for seats in the House may elect to receive public 
 
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2004/11/2004-election-outcome-money-wi.html (last visited 
May 18, 2009).   
 171. See Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2774 (2008) (acknowledging that wealthy candidates 
have an advantage while campaigning). 
 172. See id. at 2771–72 (inferring that BCRA‘s enhanced contribution limits are a penalty to 
the self-financing candidate who ―robustly exercises [his] First Amendment right‖). 
 173. See Brief of Appellee at 31, Davis, 128 S. Ct. 2759 (No. 07-320) (―More fundamentally, 
however, appellant cannot have it both ways.  If he claims constitutional injury from his 
opponent‘s increased funding options, he cannot turn around and deny that he derives a benefit 
from keeping the baseline limits in place.‖). 
 174. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2779 (stating that § 319(a)‘s increased contribution limits would 
reduce the non-self-financing candidate‘s burden of fundraising). 
 175. See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 245–46 (2006) (discussing the ―increased 
fundraising demands‖ of the non-wealthy candidate).  While the Randall plurality rejected a 
government interest in protecting a candidates time, one commentator suggests that the court is 
not foreclosed from recognizing such a governmental interest because Randall was decided on 
stare decisis grounds rather than on the merits.  Jessica Furst, Money and Politics: Will 
Expenditure Limits Take Candidates Out of the Money Race and Put Them Back in the Office?, 59 
FLA. L. REV. 873, 903 (2007).  Furst suggests that the Randall plurality‘s rejection of the 
government‘s interest in protection of candidates‘ time presents an opportunity for challenge in 
the future because the plurality did not support its judgment with precedent.  Id. at 890. 
 176. 2 U.S.C. 441a-1(a)(3) (2006). 
 177. Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 
1390, 1392 & n.11 (1994) (citing 14 JAMES MADISON, THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 197 
(Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1983)). 
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funding.178  However, a candidate that chooses public funding must abide 
by a statutory cap,179 whereas a candidate who personally funds his own 
campaign may make unlimited expenditures.180  Today, many states allow a 
publicly funded candidate to receive additional ―matching‖ funds whenever 
a self-financing candidate makes expenditures above a certain limit.181  
However, under Davis, self-financing candidates claim that they must chill 
their expenditures to avoid providing the benefit of ―matching funds‖ to the 
non-wealthy candidate.182  Thus, even though candidates have equal 
contribution limits in most states, matching-funds provisions are now 
constitutionally unsecure and non-wealthy candidates lack an avenue to 
effectively campaign against their wealthy opponents.183   
Davis has already impacted public financing ―matching funds‖ laws in 
several states.  First, in McComish v. Brewer,184 candidates for public office 
sought to enjoin the state‘s distribution of funds under Arizona‘s ―matching 
funds‖ public financing law.185  The United States District Court for the 
District of Arizona found that the statute most likely violated the First 
Amendment in light of Davis‘s holding.186  The Court determined that the 
statute penalized self-financing candidates for funding their own campaigns 
whenever the state distributed additional funds to publicly funded 
 
 178. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2772 (majority opinion).  Currently, only fifteen states provide direct 
public financing to candidates; however, the financing schemes differ widely.  Public Financing in 
the States, http://www.commoncause.org/site/pp.asp?c=dkLNK1MQIwG&b=4773825 (last 
visited May 18, 2009). 
 179. For example, in Maryland, candidates for governor who elect to publicly fund their 
campaigns are limited to spending the product of twenty cents times the population of the state.  
MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 15-104 note (2003). 
 180. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2772.  
 181. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A §§ 1121–1128 (2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 
55C, §§ 1–12 (2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 169.265 (2005). 
 182. E.g., McComish v. Brewer, No. cv-08-1550-PHX-ROS, 2008 WL 4629337, at *2–*3 (D. 
Ariz. Oct. 17, 2008) (stating claims of various plaintiff-candidates alleging that Arizona‘s public 
financing laws chill their speech). 
 183. See, e.g., Adam Bonin, Opinion, Average Joes Struggle To Be Heard as Campaign 
System Favors the Rich, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 7, 2008, at A15, available at 
http://njcitizenaction.org/news/cfr167.html (―Because [asymmetrical public funding] reforms call 
for government spending to boost the speech of some candidates and not others, however, the 
Supreme Court decision now calls them into constitutional doubt.‖).  But see Paul S. Ryan, Public 
Financing After Davis: “The Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated,” CAMPAIGN LEGAL 
CENTER BLOG, Jul. 23, 2008, http://www.clcblog.org/blog_item-239.html (arguing that Davis 
should not lead courts to hold that public financing statutes are unconstitutional). 
 184. No. cv-08-1550-PHX-ROS, 2008 WL 4629337. 
 185. Id. at *1. 
 186. Id. at *6–*9 (stating that the plaintiffs had shown a high likelihood of success in 
challenging Arizona‘s Citizens Clean Elections Act, which matched publicly funded candidates to 
privately funded candidates). 
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candidates.187  Second, primarily as a result of concerns over the effect of 
Davis, the New Jersey legislature refused to reenact the successful 2007 
New Jersey Fair and Clean Elections Pilot Project Act,188 which was 
similar to the BCRA.189  Lastly, California‘s similar fund-matching statute, 
the California Clean Money and Fair Elections Act,190 has been criticized 
as likely violating the First Amendment after Davis.191  Thus, Davis calls 
into question many viable and effective public financing schemes that 
merely aid the non-wealthy candidate in making his voice heard.192 
C.  Had the Court Applied “Closely Drawn” Scrutiny to BCRA’s 
Section 319(a), the Result Would Have Furthered the First 
Amendment Interests of Both Candidates 
By applying strict scrutiny to the BCRA‘s contribution limits, the 
Court invalidated a law that increased the amount of free speech possible in 
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political campaigns.193  Instead, the Court should have upheld the BCRA‘s 
contribution limits under the ―closely drawn‖ standard, as established by 
Buckley and its progeny.194  Doing so would have improved political 
fairness and efficiency in several ways. 
First, Section 319(a) increases the amount of free speech in the 
electoral process.  When a non-wealthy candidate receives higher 
contributions, political campaigns will experience more free speech, thus 
furthering the purpose of the First Amendment.195  With Section 319(a), 
Congress merely enabled the non-wealthy candidate to promote his 
platform so voters can make informed decisions on election day.196  As 
Justice Stevens emphasized, if only the wealthy candidate can promote his 
platform because he has the resources to do so, voters may make less 
informed decisions.197   
Second, Section 319(a) allows both wealthy and non-wealthy 
candidates to spend more time meeting voters and discussing issues and less 
time fundraising.198  The self-financing candidate does not suffer the 
burden of fundraising, but instead puts pressure on his opponent to ―raise 
and spend amounts that will match the high-spenders.‖199  The BCRA‘s 
enhanced contribution limits alleviate that pressure because the candidate 
may receive funds from fewer donors to match his opponent, thus saving 
time.200  A reduction in fundraising time would benefit the political system 
because candidates would spend more time speaking to the voters and 
debating issues.201  In contrast, without support, a non-wealthy candidate 
must struggle to fundraise from more sources in order to make his voice 
heard, thus decreasing his ability to exercise his right to free speech in the 
campaigning process.202 
 
 193. See Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2780 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (―Enhancing the 
speech of the millionaire‘s opponent . . . advances [the First Amendment‘s] core principles.‖). 
 194. See supra Part IV.A. 
 195. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2780. 
 196. See id. 
 197. Id. (―If only one candidate can make himself heard, the voter‘s ability to make an 
informed choice is impaired.‖).  In contrast, without §319(a), a wealthy candidate can dominate 
the media simply by outspending his non-wealthy opponent.  Cf. supra note 170. 
 198. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2779; see also Richard Briffault, The Return of Spending Limits: 
Campaign Finance After Landell v. Sorrell, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 399, 429–32 (2005) (arguing 
that the most disturbing consequences of our current campaign finance system are the distraction 
of officeholders from their official duties, and ―the increasing tendency of the fundraising system 
to discourage‖ non-wealthy candidates from campaigning). 
 199. Briffault, supra note 198, at 424–25. 
 200. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2779; see also Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544, 1553 (8th Cir. 
1996) (stating that reducing the time candidates spend fundraising, ―thereby increasing the time 
available for discussions of the issues,‖ is a compelling state interest). 
 201. See Furst, supra note 175, at 890. 
 202. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2779.  
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/academics/journals/mdlr/endnotes/68_Vadera.pdf 
60 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ENDNOTES [VOL. 68:39 
Lastly, Section 319(a) promotes the notion that congressional seats are 
not for sale.203  The perception that public office can be purchased reduces 
voter confidence,204 which increases the risk that voters may drop out of the 
electoral process.205  However, effective and healthy democracy depends 
on the participation of the electorate.206  Thus, by providing an avenue for a 
non-wealthy candidate to promote his platform equally against a wealthy, 
self-financing opponent, voter confidence in the electoral process will 
increase. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In Davis v. FEC, the Supreme Court of the United States held that 
Section 319(a) of the BCRA violated the First Amendment because it 
impermissibly chilled a self-financing candidate‘s speech.207  In so holding, 
the Court incorrectly struck down Section 319(a) by applying strict 
scrutiny, rather than ―closely drawn‖ scrutiny.208  Failing to apply the 
appropriate standard to Section 319(a), the Court closed off viable avenues 
for non-wealthy candidates to compete against wealthy candidates for 
congressional seats.209  Had the Court properly applied ―closely drawn‖ 
scrutiny, it would likely have upheld the BCRA‘s contribution limits, which 
would have legitimized campaign finance reform by allowing non-wealthy 
candidates to compete equally with wealthy candidates for a seat in the 
House.210 
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